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Abstract
The experimental evaluation of fault-tolerance studies relies
on tools that inject errors while programs are running, and
then monitor the execution and the output for faulty execu-
tion. In particular, the established methodology in software-
based transient-fault reliability studies, involves running
each workload hundreds or thousands of times, injecting a
random bit-flip in the process. The majority of such studies
rely on custom-built fault-injection tools that are based on
either a modified processor simulator, or a code instrumenta-
tion framework. Such tools are non-trivial to develop, and are
usually orders of magnitude slower than native execution.
In this paper we present ZOFI, a novel timing-based fault-
injection tool that is aimed at being used in fault-coverage
studies for transient faults. ZOFI is a zero-overhead tool,
meaning that the analyzed workload runs at native speed.
This is orders-of-magnitude faster compared to common
approaches that are designed around simulators or code
instrumentation tools. ZOFI is free software and is available
at https://github.com/vporpo/zofi.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Transient faults, also known as soft errors, are faults that
occur once and do not persist [40]. They are a major cause
of reliability issues, as it has been shown in several stud-
ies [9, 26, 37, 41]. These faults can be attributed to a range of
factors, including alpha particles striking the silicon circuits,
fluctuations in the power supply and others. Such events can
cause bit-flips in digital circuits, which can corrupt the state
of the logic. A transient fault in a processor can change the
outcome of instructions, possibly leading to wrong execu-
tion, which can potentially cause a system crash. Transient
faults are fairly frequent in large data centers [26], due to the
large number of systems, and therefore such systems have
to be designed with transient faults in mind.
Software-based error detection techniques, e.g., [6, 12, 27–
29, 31, 33, 38, 46, 48, 49] , aim at providing reliability at
the software level. Such techniques work by replicating the
code at either the instruction, the thread or the process level,
in an attempt to detect transient faults. The evaluation of
their effectiveness is done with the help of fault-injection
tools which apply random register bit-flips and check the
result for either: (i) successful detection by the technique,
(ii) data corruption, (iii) infinite execution, (iv) exception, or
(v) correct execution, also known as masked errors.
1.1 Types of Fault-injection Tools
Fault-coverage evaluation for transient faults implements
the single-event upset model. It requires the use of a tool
that runs the target workload, pauses it, injects a bit-flip,
resumes its execution and then tracks its execution to check
for a faulty outcome. In the error detection literature this is
commonly done in various ways:
1. Source Code Editing: Delete, or modify instructions
in the source code or in the compiler intermediate
representation. This is a straight-forward approach,
but it does not accurately model transient faults. An
example of a study that uses this is [30].
2. Simulator/Emulator:Modify a processor simulator
such that it can inject a fault at a given execution
cycle. Depending on the accuracy of the simulation,
this can vary from extremely slow (e.g., at the RTL-
level), to quite slow (tens/hundreds of MIPS) for the
fastest emulators. This is a very popular technique and
has been used in several studies, including [5, 11, 13,
18, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 36, 39].
3. Binary, Source, or Compiler-IR Instrumentation:
Build a custom binary-instrumentation tool using a
framework like Pin[25], and implement fault-injection
with it, or use a tool based on this approach, like
LLFI [43], PINFI [47] and SASSIFI [19]. The instru-
mentation overhead is still quite significant, leading
to execution much shower than the non-instrumented
binary. A few examples of studies using this approach
are [7, 10, 16, 17, 21, 24, 32–35, 38, 46].
4. Timing-based Tool: Run the unmodified binary on
native hardware, just like with a debugger, pause the
execution, inject the fault and resume the execution
at native speed. This is by far the fastest of the three,
and as we explain in the text, it is also equally accu-
rate for statistical fault coverage analysis as long as
micro-architectural accuracy is not required. We are
aware of a relatively small number of studies that use
this approach [8, 29, 42, 44, 45, 48]. In these studies a
custom in-house tool was developed, usually designed
around a debugger, like GDB [15].
In this paper we present ZOFI, a complete fault-coverage
analysis tool, based on the time-based design, that executes
the unmodified binary on native hardwarewith no extra over-
heads whatsoever. It executes the test binary at full native
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speed, then pauses it a given time for the fault injection to
occur. Once the binary is stopped, the ZOFI tool can modify
the state of the target workload by injecting a fault, imple-
mented as a register bit-flip, and then resumes its execution.
The workload will either execute to completion, or will get
interrupted by a signal. At that point ZOFI compares its out-
put against the original run, and determines the type of the
execution outcome. In case of an infinite execution, ZOFI
will force-stop the workload. After repeating this process
for a large number of such test runs and collecting statistics
data, the final results are summarized and reported to the
user.
The ZOFI tool is free software, distributed under the GPL
version 2.0 license. The project is hosted at https://github.
com/vporpo/zofi and is implemented in C++. The tool is
designed for modern x86_64 Linux-based systems.
2 Background and Motivation
This section presents an overview of the established fault
coverage evaluation methodology (Section 2.1), and moti-
vates the need for timing-based injection tools, like ZOFI, in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
2.1 Overview of the Fault-Coverage Evaluation
Methodology for Transient Faults
An overview of a typical fault coverage evaluation of a binary
is shown in Figure 1. The input to the process is the binary
that we are analyzing, along with its inputs, which are not
shown in the figure.
The first step is to run the binary, measure its execution
time (or cycles) and collect all its outputs. This includes
stdout, stderr, exit code and all output files. We refer
to this initial run as the “Original Run”, and it is shown as
the top-most run in Figure 1. The execution time (cycles) of
the original run is used:
1. as an upper bound to the fault injection time (cycle),
and
2. as an estimate of how long the analyzed workload
should take to complete, such that we can detect and
force-stop infinite executions.
The original output is used to check the output of the test
runs, as we will explain shortly.
The rest of the process involves a large number of “Test
Runs” which is where fault injection takes place. Each of
these runs executes the same binary with the same inputs,
but their state gets altered by a fault-injection event (de-
picted as a red lightning in the figure), at some point during
their execution. The injection of the fault takes place at a
random point in time (cycle) between zero and the execution
time (cycle) of the original binary. The type of fault injected
depends on our configuration, but a common fault type is
a bit-flip into registers to simulate transient faults in the
computational logic. After fault injection the binary resumes
its execution and is let free to execute to completion.
Now let’s take a look at the fault injection runs. In “Test
Run 1” of Figure 1, the fault leads to output (the red deformed
block) that differs form that of the original run. This is caught
by the comparator component, which reports a “Corruption”.
Another example of a test run is “Test Run 2”, where the
state of the execution gets damaged by the fault in such
a way that leads to infinite execution. This can be caused,
among others, by faults that lead to a faulty evaluation of the
condition bit of a loop latch. If the execution of the binary
takes far longer than the original execution time, an alarm
goes off that forces the workload to stop. This is reported as
“Infinite Execution”.
A third example is “Test Run 3”, where the fault leads to an
illegal operation that triggers an exception. Common exam-
ples are: memory instructions that attempt to access memory
outside their allocated memory, floating point exceptions
and others. This is reported as an “Exception”.
“Test Run 4” shows an example where the injected fault
does not cause any failure whatsoever. The test run executes
to completion, its output is identical to the original one, and
it did not trigger any exception. This can happen when the
bit affected by the fault remains unused by subsequent com-
putation. For example, it may be overwritten or discarded by
the rest of the execution. This type of run reports is reported
as “Masked” (also known as “Benign”).
Finally, in error detection studies, the system itself has
a way of detecting errors and reporting them to the fault-
injection framework. This is shown in “Test Run 5”. The
error detection system can notify the injection tool that it
has detected an error in several ways: For example, it can
return a specific exit code, or it can print specific output to
stderr. This is reported as “Detected”.
2.2 Fault Coverage Analysis is Time Consuming
Fault coverage is a Monte-Carlo statistical analysis that relies
on a large number of experiments. In each experiment we run
the workload and we inject a random fault into it at a random
time. Thus, the time it takes to run all these experiments is
comparable to running all these workloads to completion.
Achieving good accuracy, requires us to run the work-
load hundreds or thousands of times. Therefore, if our fault-
coverage analysis tool introduces a large performance over-
head, for example by using a simulator for running the work-
load, then the analysis becomes impractical even for work-
loads that would run relatively fast on native hardware. The
ZOFI timing-based injection tool is designed to make such
analysis practical, even for long-running workloads, by re-
moving the overhead introduced by the fault-injection tool.
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Figure 1. A typical fault coverage evaluation process.
Table 1. High-level comparison of fault injection tool designs.
Type Speed Granularity Injection Accuracy Access to u-arch
Source Code Editing Native Instruction Fixed (Not a Transient Fault) No
Simulator (cycle accurate) Low u-Op Cycle (High) Yes
Emulator (functional) Med Instruction Dynamic Instr. Count (Med) No
Binary Instrumentation Med Instruction Dynamic Instr. Count (Med) No
Timing-based (ZOFI) Native Instruction Time (Low) No
2.3 Timing-based Tool: No Need for Cycle Accuracy
in Fault-Coverage Analysis
As explained in Section 1.1, there are several types of fault
injection tool designs, which are summarized in Table 1.
Each of them operates at different speeds, has different fault-
injection granularity and accuracy, and may or may not
have access to micro-architectural components. In this work,
we argue that for most practical use-cases the timing-based
design is the best option, because it provides the maximum
possible test speed without sacrificing the accuracy of our
statistical analysis.
Since fault coverage is a statistical analysis that does not
require cycle accuracy, there is no real need to sacrifice exe-
cution speed for cycle accuracy. Therefore, we believe that
the proposed timing-based design of ZOFI should be the
choice of preference for most studies, similarly to sampling-
based profiling tools (e.g., [2, 3]) which are adequate for
many profiling scenarios.
Simulator-based tools give us access to themicro-architectural
state, which is not accessible by the other techniques. How-
ever, this comes at the cost of a huge overhead in execution
speed, limiting its practical uses to small execution kernels
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or traces. We believe that for any fault-coverage study that
does not need access to micro-architectural state, it is more
preferable to use any of the alternative techniques.
Therefore, once the cycle accuracy is not required, one
could use any of the other designs interchangeably, with an
equivalent outcome. None of the emulators, the instrumentation-
based, or the timing-based tools have access to the micro-
architectural components, as they are all limited to the state
exposed by the ISA.Moreover, while emulators and instrumentation-
based tools do have an instruction-based injection accuracy
(as they can stop at precisely a specific number of dynamic
instructions), we argue that this is not really needed for
statistical analysis, as the faults get injected at random cy-
cles anyway. Therefore, we can safely use a random time
instead of a random dynamic instruction, and this should
give us equivalent results. As a result, timing-based fault
injection tools, like ZOFI, are as effective as emulators and
instrumentation-based tools, in their fault injection analysis,
but with the additional benefit of being orders of magnitude
faster.
3 ZOFI Design
This section describes ZOFI in more detail. It provides a
description of the design and implementation, and lists a set
of important features.
3.1 Overview
Just like any other fault-coverage analysis tool (as shown in
Figure 1), the high-level steps followed by the ZOFI tool are
the following:
1. Run the workload with no fault injection to measure
its execution time and collect its original output. We
refer to this as the “Original Run”.
2. Fork and spawn a new process for the test run of the
workload. This is where fault injection will take place.
3. In the meantime, pick a random time point between
zero and the execution time of the original run. This
will be the time point when the fault injection will
take place. Sleep for this amount of time.
4. Wake up and stop the test process. Analyze the cur-
rently executed instruction and randomly pick a regis-
ter. The type of register to be picked is controlled by
the user options provided.
5. Flip a random bit of that register.
6. Let the process continue to completion.
7. Collect the output and compare it against the original
run.
3.2 Design
ZOFI is designed around the ptrace Linux system call, that
provides the means by which one process (the ZOFI tool)
can observe and control the execution of another process
(the workload). This is commonly used by debuggers for
observing, controlling and updating the state of the debugged
binary. The ptrace calls give you full access to the register
state, the memory and the code. It is therefore a perfect fit
for our fault injection tool.
.
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Figure 2. The design of the fault-injection run.
Fault injection works as follows. The execution of the
workload is interrupted by a signal emitted by the main
process of the tool, and its register state is imported into
the tool. So at this point, ZOFI has access to the instruction
pointer, but does not know what type of instruction this is,
in order to analyze it and access the registers it reads/writes.
The analysis of the instruction is done using the capstone [1]
library. This provides the list of the accessed registers, the
type of each access (read/write), whether this is an explicitly
or implicitly accessed register and other information, giving
the user a good level of control on the type of registers that
are targeted by faults.
An overview of the design of the fault-injection part of
ZOFI is shown in Figure 2. The tool process (tracer) forks
4
Program
WrittenRegs = [xmm7, rflags, rip] 
AllRegs = [xmm1, rbp, xmm7, rflags, rip]
ReadRegs = [xmm1, rbp, rip]
Implicitly Accessed
Analyze Instruction
vaddsd xmm7, xmm1, qword ptr [rbp − 0xf0]IP
Figure 3. Analyzing the instruction at the current Instruc-
tion Pointer (IP), to collect the accessed registers for each
register type.
a new child process which becomes the tracee. Initially the
child process sets up an alarm so that it receives a signal
after some time if it gets stuck in an infinite execution loop.
After an initial synchronization, the tool process sleeps for a
random time until it is time for the fault injection. Meanwhile
the child process switches to the target binary image with
a call to execve(). Once the tracer process wakes up, it
stops the tracee with a kill(), and after a synchronization
point it performs the fault injection. Then it lets the tracee
continue, and waits for it to either run to completion, or
stop with an exception, or never complete due to infinite
execution. After the final synchronization point, the tool’s
main process compares the exit state of the test run with
that of the original run and reports the result to the results-
collection part of the tool.
3.3 Modeling of a Transient Fault
Wemodel the transient fault in a similar way as in most fault
injection studies: with a random bit-flip in a random register
from those accessed by the current instruction. Currently,
ZOFI implements a register bit-flip injection, since this is the
most widely usedmodel in the studies, but this could be easily
extended to include bit-flips inmemory. The reasoning is that
ECC memory is commonly used in server-grade hardware,
and therefore such systems can automatically recover from
transient faults in memory cells.
The random register bit-flip is implemented as follows.
After the child process gets stopped by the parent, the in-
struction pointer points to the instruction that is about to
be executed. ZOFI analyzes the instruction using the cap-
stone library [1], and collects the registers read and written
either explicitly or implicitly (for example the instruction
pointer, or the condition flags in x86). An example of this is
shown in Figure 3, where an instruction is analyzed and the
registers accessed are collected into three pools: one for the
registers being read, one for those being written, and one for
all registers being accessed. Depending on the user’s input,
ZOFI may filter out some of these registers, for example the
user may wish to skip the implicitly accessed registers, or
collect the instruction pointer only when the instruction is a
control-flow one, or even restrict the errors to registers read
or written.
Random Register and Bit  to flip
Reg Bit
if RegRead Written
ptrace() SINGLE_STEP
applyBitFlip(Reg, Bit)
ptrace() CONT
applyBitFlip(Reg, Bit)
ptrace() CONT
Figure 4. The injection process is different when the register
is read from when it is written.
The next step is to randomly select one of the registers
from the corresponding pool. Once the register is selected,
ZOFI randomly selects a bit where the bit-flip should take
place. If we are injecting errors only into registers read by
the instruction, we are now ready to apply the bit-flip and
continue the execution, as the bit-flip will be processed by the
current instruction and will flow through the execution logic.
This is shown on the left hand side of Figure 4. If, however,
we are injecting errors into the output (written) registers
of the instruction, we cannot follow the same process, as a
bit-flip performed while the child process is stopped, will be
overwritten by the output of the current instruction once it
gets executed. Therefore, in this case, ZOFI will first step into
the next instruction and will then apply the bit-flip. This is
shown on the right hand side of Figure 4. Next, the execution
of the tracee process continues.
3.4 Features
In this section we present a list of ZOFI’s most important
features:
• Execution of test runs at native speed, as there is no
emulation or instrumentation involved.
• Support for multiple concurrent test runs (jobs) us-
ing the -j N flag. In this way the test throughput
increases almost linearly to the number of cores.
• Built-in tracking of the execution state, output check-
ing and collection of statistics.
• The user can fully override the comparator function
that checks the output. The user-defined comparator
runs in a system shell.
• Support for multi-threaded workloads (since v0.9.4).
• Option to avoid injecting faults into the system’s li-
brary code. This is particularly helpful for accurate
measurements of workloads that are protected by fault-
tolerance techniques linked against non-protected sys-
tem libraries.
• Fine control of where the faults will be injected.
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• Modular design and implementation in modern C++
and well documented code. Easy to modify and extend.
3.5 Limitations
The main limitation of ZOFI is not due to its implementation,
but rather due to its timing-based design. If the target work-
load runs for a very small amount of time, then ZOFI won’t
be able to effectively inject faults, often attempting to inject
the fault after the workload has finished executing. This is a
common problem to all timing-based tasks on real systems.
For example, even measuring the absolute execution time of
a workload is not reliable when the execution lasts for a very
short time. When we get close to the time accuracy of the
system, any timing-based functionality becomes unreliable.
We observed that it is best if the workload runs for at least
tens or hundreds of milliseconds.
Another limitation is the evaluation of workloads that
misbehave when being stopped with a signal. ZOFI relies on
signals to pause the applications, therefore it cannot properly
analyze such types of workloads.
4 Results
This section provides a quantitative evaluation of ZOFI by
presenting a set of results on: (i) its performance overhead
compared to a native run (Section 4.2), (ii) a fault-coverage
analysis of the NAS NPB-2.3[4] benchmark suite for various
types of fault injection (Section 4.3), and (iii) an evaluation
of the accuracy of the results as we increase the count of test
runs (Section 4.4).
4.1 Experimental Setup
The target platform is a Linux-4.9.0, glibc-2.23 based sys-
tem with an Intel® Core™ i5-6440HQ quad-core CPU and
8 GB RAM. We evaluated ZOFI using the NAS NPB-2.3[4]
benchmarks that we compiled with gcc-4.8.2[14] using -O3
-mtune=native flags. We used ZOFI 0.9.1 from https://
github.com/vporpo/zofi.
4.2 ZOFI Performance Overhead
As already mentioned in previous sections, ZOFI introduces
no performance overhead, because the binary is completely
unmodified, and executes on the physical hardware at na-
tive speed while being ptraced. In order to further back
our claim, we measured the execution time of the the NAS
benchmarks, class A: (i) by calling them directly from the ter-
minal, and (ii) through the ZOFI tool with the fault injection
disabled. The normalized results are shown in Figure 5.
It is fairly clear from the figure that there is practically
no performance difference between the two measurements.
ZOFI does indeed execute the binaries at native speed.
We also performed a second set of experiments, where
we compared the execution time of the original code versus
the ZOFI run with an injection that lead to a masked fault.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
bt.A cg.A ep.A ft.A is.A lu.A mg.A sp.A
 
Original
ZOFI
Figure 5. Execution time normalized to the original (na-
tive) execution. The ZOFI tool introduces no performance
overhead.
The time taken by the ZOFI run, including the injection was
practically identical to the original run.
4.3 Case Study: NAS Benchmarks
We compiled the full NPB2.3[4] suite with the class W prob-
lem size, and then used ZOFI to run it, using the configura-
tion listed in Table 2. Each binary was executed 1000 times
(-test-runs 1000), and we used all 4 cores of the target
processor (-j 4). We also used the custom diff shown in
Listing 1 which filters out the output, removing those strings
that vary on each run (like the throughput Mop/s, the exact
execution time and the compilation date). ZOFI gives us the
option to choose the register types that the faults will be
injected to. For these measurements we tested five of them,
as listed in Table 2, ranging from explicitly accessed written
registers (“we”), to explicitly or implicitly read or written,
and with faults to the program counter enabled (“rweico”).
Table 2. ZOFI Configuration.
Flag Value
-j 4
-test-runs 1000
-diff-cmd See Listing 1
-inject-to “we”(Figure 6(a)), “rwe”(Figure 6(b)),
“rwei” (Figure 6(c)), “rweic” (Figure 6(d)),
and “rweico” (Figure 6(e))
For the first set of results1, we injected fautls only into
the explicitly accessed written registers (“we”), as shown
in Figure 6(a). For the second run of the benchmarks, we
injected faults into both explicitly read and written registers
(“rwe”), and we report the results in Figure 6(b). Similarly,
1When checking the output of the benchmarks, we observed that is.W does
not to print the “Verification Successful”, like the rest of the benchmarks,
even in the original run. Therefore we are not confident about the results
for this specific benchmark.
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Listing 1. -diff-cmd for the experiment of Section 4.3.
1 -diff-cmd /usr/bin/diff <(/bin/grep -v ``\([Tt]ime\)\|\(Mop/s total\)\|\(Compile date\)'' %
ORIG_STDOUT) <(/bin/grep -v ``\([Tt]ime\)\|\(Mop/s total\)\|\(Compile date\)'' %TEST_STDOUT)
we enabled fault injection into implicit registers too (“rwei”),
and report the results in Figure 6(c). Next, we allowed control-
flow instructions to cause faults to the instruction pointer
(Figure 6(d)), and finally, we allowed all instructions to cause
faults to the instruction pointer (Figure 6(e)).
Analyzing the fault coverage results is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, we will mention some very obvious
points. First of all, enabling faults in the input registers (Fig-
ure 6(b)), increases the number of exceptions. This is rather
intuitive, as these registers are commonly used memory ad-
dress pointers. A bit-flip in a register that holds a memory
address has a high probability of triggering a SIGSEGV sig-
nal because of the attempt to access illegal memory. The
second point is that errors in implicitly accessed registers
(Figure 6(c)) does not seem to have a large effect. Given that
we randomly modify a bit in the flag register, the chances
of it being the one that is being used in the subsequent in-
struction seems rather low. The final point is that errors in
the program counter (Figure 6(e)) cause a dramatic increase
in the number of exceptions. This is expected, as faults in
the program counter will likely cause a jump to an illegal
address, which will trigger an exception.
4.4 Accuracy of Results as we Increase the Number
of Test Runs
It is a well known fact that the higher number of the test runs
in a Monte Carlo approach, the better the accuracy of the
results. Most studies in the software-based error-detection
literature use a few hundreds (e.g., [22, 28]) to a few thou-
sands (e.g., [48]) of runs for the fault coverage evaluation.
The number of runs is usually selected in an arbitrary man-
ner. In this section we are looking into the error that one
can expect across independent runs of ZOFI, for a couple
of benchmarks of the NPB2.3 suite. We selected cg.W, ft.W
and mg.W because these run the fastest among all bench-
marks in the suite. To this end, we varied the number of
program runs from 50 to 6400, running each configuration
10 times, and calculating the arithmetic mean and standard
deviation of the results across these 10 repetitions. This is a
total of 382500 runs, which took about a day to run on our
i5-6440HQ quad-core system. The configurations that we
tested are summarized in Table 3.
Figures 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c) show the arithmetic mean of
the fault coverage results for cg.W, ft.W and mg.W, as we
increase the test runs from 50 to 6400. In other words, each
run of the ZOFI tool reports the percentages of each out-
come. These results will vary across runs, so we collect this
data across all 10 runs and we report the arithmetic mean
in Figures 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c) and the standard deviation in
Table 3. ZOFI Configuration for results of Section 4.4.
Flag Value
-j 4
-test-runs 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600, 3200, 6400
-inject-to “rwe”
-diff-cmd See Listing 1
Figures 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c). Each line in the standard-deviation
plots represents the outcome (i.e., Corruption, Infinite Exe-
cution, Exception and Masked).
What is particularly interesting, is that the arithmetic
mean across 10 runs of ZOFI seems to be quite accurate even
for just 50 test runs of the workload. However, the error
across these 10 runs of the tool is quite high, meaning that
we could not trust the fault coverage reported by a single
50-test run of the tool.
As expected, the standard deviation decreases as we in-
crease the number of runs. This is clearly shown in Fig-
ures 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c). There is, however, some noise in
these results, particularly towards smaller values of the num-
ber of test-runs, which would probably improve if we ran
the tool more than 10 times. We can also observe that the
decrease of the error is rather small compared to the increase
of the number of runs. Please note that the horizontal axis
of these plots is in logarithmic scale, and even so the error
deviation decreases at a diminishing rate.
5 Conclusion
This work presented ZOFI, a timing-based Zero-Overhead
Fault Injection tool for very fast fault coverage evaluation
at native speed. Unlike the frameworks used in the majority
of software-based error detection studies, ZOFI does not
instrument the binary nor does it run it on a simulator.
Instead, it runs the unmodified workload directly on na-
tive hardware, with no performance overhead whatsoever.
It is a timing-based tool, meaning that it operates at time-
points, not at cycles. It collects fault-coverage statistics across
multiple test runs and reports their summary upon comple-
tion. ZOFI is distributed as free software and is available at
https://github.com/vporpo/zofi.
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(d) Fault coverage with faults into all input and
output registers, including the instruction pointer
for control-flow changing instructions.(“rweic”).
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Figure 6. Fault coverage of NPB2.3, for various types of injected registers. The configuration for these tests is shown in Table 2
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Figure 7. Mean fault coverage (%) across 10 repetitions of ZOFI, as we vary the number of runs from 50 to 6400, injecting into
explicitly written registers (“rwe”).
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Figure 8. Standard deviation of the fault coverage results across 10 repetitions of ZOFI, as we vary the number of runs from
50 to 6400. The mean values of these experiments are shown in Figure 7.
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